

## Message Text

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NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 SAM-01 SAJ-01 SAB-01 ACDA-19 MC-02 EB-11

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R 261120Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3498

INFO AMEMBASSY DACCA

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMCONSUL KARACHI

AMCONSUL LAHORE

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

USLO PEKING

CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 ISLAMABAD 1955

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PK

SUBJ: IN THE WAKE OF THE SUMMIT -- PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

SUMMARY: PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY OVER PAST YEAR HAS  
BEEN QUITE SUCCESSFUL IN ATTAINING OR APPROACHING ITS  
MAIN GOALS, IN WHICH JUST-COMPLETED LAHORE SUMMIT  
PLAYED APPRECIABLE ROLE. PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN  
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WORKING OUT ACCOMMODATION WITH INDIA, ALTHOUGH PACE

IS SLOW AND DISTRUST REMAINS. AT SAME TIME, PAKS SEEM TO BE READJUSTING THEIR THINKING TOWARD ACCEPTANCE INDIA'S PHYSICAL SUPERIORITY, ALTHOUGH NOT HEGEMONY. VARIOUS ADVANCES IN POLICY TOWARD BANGLADESH WERE CAPPED BY DRAMATIC BREAKTHROUGH OF PAK RECOGNITION AT LAHORE SUMMIT. SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PEKING HAS CONTINUED THROUGH PAST YEAR, BUT WITH SOME SIGNS RECENTLY OF SLIGHT UNEASINESS OVER TRENDS IN CHINA'S DOMESTIC POLITICS. GOP'S TWO-TRACK POLICY TOWARD SOVIET UNION FURTHER DEVELOPED, WITH OVERT COOPERATION SET AGAINST STRONGLY BUT PRIVATELY EXPRESSED PAK CONCERN OVER SOVIET INTENTIONS. GOAL OF EXPANDING PAK INFLUENCE AMONG MUSLIM STATES AND AMONG THIRD WORLD AS WHOLE GIVEN MAJOR BOOST BY SUMMIT. TIES WITH IRAN AND GULF STATES BROADENED, ALTHOUGH INDICATIONS OF SOME DISSATISFACTION WITH FORMER. RELATIONS WITH US HAVE REMAINED CORDIAL, EVEN THOUGH FRUSTRATIONS ARE INCREASING OVER ARMS SUPPLY QUESTION. OVERALL, PAKS APPEAR TO HAVE ERASED UNFAVORABLE WORLD IMAGE STEMMING FROM 1971 EVENTS. MAIN NEW FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS ON HORIZON INCLUDE AFGHANISTAN AND, ON MUCH BROADER SCALE, IMPACT OF WORLD ENERGY CRISIS. END SUMMARY.

1. ISLAMIC SUMMIT JUST CONCLUDED IN LAHORE WAS LARGELY CREATION OF PAKISTAN'S DIPLOMACY, WITH BULK OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS AT LEAST INITIALLY HAVING SHOWN LITTLE OR NO ENTHUSIASM FOR IT. PAKS ARE CURRENTLY ENJOYING ARDENTLY SOUGHT PRESTIGE OF HAVING PLAYED HOSTS TO LEADERS REPRESENTING MOST OF WORLD'S MUSLIMS PLUS THE LARGELY "HONORARY MUSLIMS" OF UGANDA AND SOME OTHER AFRICAN PARTICIPANTS. THEY ARE ALSO CONGRATULATING SELVES ON HAVING PRODUCED CONFERENCE'S MOST DRAMATIC MOMENT IN LAST-MINUTE RECOGNITION OF AND PARTICIPATION BY BANGLADESH. AT THIS MOMENT OF SUCCESS FOR BHUTTO AND HIS GOVERNMENT, THIS MESSAGE TAKES BRIEF LOOK AT MAIN ASPECTS OF PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY AS IT HAS EVOLVED OVER PAST YEAR OR SO.

2. IF GOP LEADERSHIP HAD BEEN ASKED IN EARLY 1973 TO SPECIFY ITS MAIN FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES FOR COMING YEAR LIST WOULD PROBABLY HAVE LOOKED LIKE LGIS:

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(A) OBTAIN RETURN OF PAK POW'S FROM INDIA AT MINIMUM COST TO PAKISTAN;

(B) GET BANGLADESH TO DROP WAR CRIMES TRIALS OF THE 195 POW'S, AGAIN AT MINIMUM COST;

(C) COMPLETE TASK OF RESTORING PAKISTAN'S IMAGE IN THE WORLD, BADLY TARNISHED BY 1971 EVENTS BUT CONSIDERABLY

REFURBISHED BY BHUTTO REGIME SINCE THEN;

(D) MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA;

(E) ENHANCE PAKISTAN'S POSITION AND INFLUENCE IN THIRD WORLD, ESPECIALLY AMONG MUSLIM STATES AND MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA;

(F) FURTHER DEVELOP CLOSE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC TIES WITH IRAN AND PERSIAN GULF STATES;

(G) PURSUE CAUTIOUS RAPPROACHMENT WITH SOVIET UNION AND OBTAIN ADDITIONAL SOVIET AID;

(H) MAINTAIN CLOSE RELATIONS WITH US, SECURE CONTINUATION OF US ROLE AS LEADING SOURCE ECONOMIC AID, AND ESPECIALLY, GET US TO LIFT ITS EMBARGO ON MILITARY SUPPLY TO PAKISTAN.

TO RATHER IMPRESSIVE DEGREE, PAKS HAVE ATTAINED OR AT LEAST MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN THESE OBJECTIVES OVER PAST TWELVE MONTHS. INEVITABLY, HOWEVER, PROGRESS ITSELF HAS BROUGHT NEW SET OF PROBLEMS FOR GOP, WHILE OTHERS OF RELATIVELY SERIOUS NATURE HAVE SINCE ARISEN -- MOST NOTABLY WORLDWIDE ENERGY CRISIS AND, ON LESSER SCALE, AFGHANISTAN'S REVIVAL OF ACTIVE PUSHTUNISTAN POLICY.

3. INDIA HAS REMAINED AND WILL CONTINUE IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE TO BE CHIEF FOCUS OF PAKISTAN'S INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS. THE TORTUOUS COURSE OF INDO-PAK ACCOMMODATION, BEGUN IN 1972 SIMLA AGREEMENT, WAS FURTHER ADVANCED OVER PAST YEAR, MOST NOTABLY BY DELHI AGREEMENT IN CONFIDENTIAL

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AUGUST. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS AGREEMENT WAS CONSIDERABLY ACHIEVEMENT FOR GOP IN THAT IT GAINED ITS GOAL OF GETTING BACK POW'S WITHOUT PAYING TOO MUCH FROM ITS SLENDER SUPPLY OF BARGAINING ASSETS IN RETURN. WITH REPATRIATION PROCESS NEAR COMPLETION, GOP IS NOW LOOKING TOWARD NEXT ROUND IN SIMLA IMPLEMENTATION, I.E., RESTORATION TRADE, COMMUNICATIONS AND IN DUE COURSE, DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. AS IN PAST, IMPLEMENTATION LIKELY TO BE SLOW PROCESS, MARKED BY INCESSANT HAGGLING, CHARGES OF BAD FAITH AND OTHER REMINDERS THAT RESERVOIR OF DEEP BITTERNESS AND MISTRUST REMAINS DESPITE THE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS SINCE DECEMBER 1971.

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INFO AMEMBASSY DACCA

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AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

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CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 ISLAMABAD 1955

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

4. WE HAVE IMPRESSION THAT PAST YEAR HAS SEEN SOME  
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN OVERALL PAK ATTITUDE TOWARD ITS  
FEARED NEIGHBOR. ALTHOUGH STILL TALKING ALMOST DESPERATELY  
OF NEED TO RETAIN SOME "BALANCE" IN MILITARY STRENGTH,  
PAKS ARE GRADUALLY BECOMING USED TO THINKING OF SELVES  
AS SMALL NEIGHBOR OF INDIA RATHER THAN RIVAL FOR INFLUENCE  
IN SUBCONTINENT. ALL TALK OF "HAVING ANOTHER GO AT THEM"  
HAS DISAPPEARED, AND PAK MILITARY THINKING IS NO LONGER  
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FOCUSING ON DREAM OF COMPARABILITY WITH INDIA BUT ON MORE MODEST GOAL OF DEVELOPING CREDIBLE DETERRENT. PAKS COMPLAIN BITTERLY OVER WHAT THEY SEE AS INDIAN INTENTION TO DOMINATE SUBCONTINENT AND ASSERT THEIR DETERMINATION NEVER TO SUBMIT TO INDIAN POLICY DIRECTION, BUT THEY FINALLY ARE PREPARED TO RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER UNCOMFORTABLY, INDIA'S VAST PHYSICAL SUPERIORITY.

5. BEYOND THIS, BHUTTO HAS CONTINUED HIS ENDEAVORS TO BROADEN PAK FOREIGN POLICY VIEWPOINT AND TURN AWAY FROM OBSESSION WITH INDIA THAT MARKED POLICIES OF EARLIER REGIMES. GEOPOLITICAL FACTS OF LIFE DICTATE THAT INDIA WILL ALWAYS REMAIN PAKISTAN'S NUMBER ONE EXTERNAL CONCERN, BUT BHUTTO SEEMS DETERMINED THAT PAKS DEVELOP OTHER SUBSTANTIAL INTERESTS AS WELL.

6. AS REGARDS BANGLADESH, THIRD ELEMENT IN THREE-WAY SUBCONTINENTAL TRIANGLE, PAKS WERE ABLE TO SECURE SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS OVER PAST YEAR INCLUDING DELINKING POW RETURN FROM RECOGNITION AND GETTING DACCA TO AGREE ON PAKS TAKING MANY FEWER NON-BENGALEES THAN BDG WISHED. DRAMATIC BREAKTHROUGH AT LAHORE SUMMIT HAS CAPPED THESE ACHIEVEMENTS. WHILE DETAILS OF BARGAIN THAT HAS BEEN STRUCK BETWEEN BHUTTO AND MUJIB ARE NOT YET KNOWN, SEEMS FOREGONE CONCLUSION THAT IT INCLUDES DEFINITE UNDERSTANDING, TACIT OR OTHERWISE, ON ABANDONMENT OR WAR CRIMES TRIALS OF THE 195 POW'S.

7. NOW THAT DACCA-ISLAMABAD RELATIONS ARE TO BE ESTABLISHED, ONE CAN ANTICIPATE INTERMINABLE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATING OVER DIVISION OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES, RESPONSIBILITY FOR NON-BENGALEES IN BANGLADESH AND MULTITUDE OF OTHER ISSUES WHICH CAN -- AND PROBABLY WILL -- EXTEND FOR DECADES. AT SAME TIME, PAK ATTITUDE TOWARD ITS FORMER EAST WING HAS EVOLVED OVER PAST YEAR TO EXTENT THAT RECOGNITION APPARENTLY IS BEING GREETED WITH RELIEF AND EQUANIMITY BY VIRTUALLY EVERYONE HERE OUTSIDE FEW RIGHT-WING ELEMENTS. MUCH OF RESIDUAL BITTERNESS TOWARD BANGLADESH HAS DIED OUT, PARTICULARLY SINCE POW'S BEGAN TO RETURN LAST AUTUMN, AND MANY PAKS ARE WILLING TO CONCEDE FREELY THAT COUNTRY'S PROSPECTS ARE FAR BETTER

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WITHOUT ITS EAST WING. PAKS ARE INCREASINGLY INCLINED TO SHIFT BLAME TO INDIA WHENEVER DACCA HAS APPEARED, IN THEIR EYES, INTRANSIGENT. THUS PAKS INSISTED INITIAL FAILURE OF EFFORTS TO WORK OUT BANGLADESH ATTENDANCE AT

LAHORE SUMMIT PRIOR TO FEBRUARY 22 BREAKTHROUGH WERE REALLY CAUSED BY INDIAN PRESSURE ON MUJIB RATHER THAN MUJIB'S OWN STANCE.

8. CHINA, EVER SINCE 1962 SINO-INDIAN WAR, HAS OCCUPIED SPECIAL POSITION IN PAK EYES, ONE DICTATED AS MUCH BY PSYCHOLOGICAL AS BY POLITICO-ECONOMIC FACTORS. FACING LARGER MORE POWERFUL INDIA, PAKS HAVE ALWAYS FELT NEED FOR MAJOR POWER "BIG BROTHER," POSITION ONCE FILLED BY US IN 1950'S AND EARLY 1960'S BUT BY CHINA EVER SINCE. PAST YEAR HAS SEEN APPARENT UNTROUBLED CONTINUATION THIS SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP, MARKED BY CHINESE DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT, FURTHER CHINESE MILITARY DELIVERIES (ALTHOUGH NOT CLEAR WHETHER ANY NEW AGREEMENTS REACHED) AND USUAL EXCHANGES OF VISITS -- PAK CHIEF OF STAFF, CHINESE FOMIN AND, MORE RECENTLY, HIGH-LEVEL CHINESE MILITARY DELEGATION. PAKS HAVE ALSO CONTINUED TO FOLLOW CHINESE WISHES IN SUCH ISSUES AS RECOGNITION SIHANOUK'S GOVERNMENT IN CAMBODIA, EVEN WHEN IT BRINGS THEM INTO RELUCTANT CONFLICT WITH US POLICY. ONLY CLOUD ON SINO-PAK HORIZON IS RECENT INDICATION THAT NEW CYCLE OF RADICAL DOMESTIC ACTIVITY MAY BE STARTING IN CHINA. MOST GOP OFFICIALS TEND TO DISMISS THIS SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVELY AS PURELY INTERNAL MATTER OF NON CONSEQUENCE TO SINO-PAK RELATIONS, BUT THE FE SEMI-SINOLOGISTS AMONG THEM SHOW OCCASIONAL SIGNS OF APPREHENSION.

9. PAKS HAVE FURTHER DEVELOPED OVER PAST YEAR THEIR TWO-TRACK ATTITUDE TOWARD SOVIET UNION. TOWARD SOVIETS THEMSELVES, GOP HAS DISPLAYED OVERT CORDIALITY, DESIRE FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS AND INTEREST IN FURTHER AID. SOVIETS HAVE RECIPROCATED BY FINALLY STARTING ON LONG-PROMISED STEEL MILL, OFFERING EXPANDED EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL COOPERATION AND BEING NICE IN SUCH WAYS AS QUICKLY REMOVING SOVIET FISHING FLEET FROM MAKRAN COAST WHEN PAKS COMPLAINED AND UNILATERALLY EXTENDING CONFIDENTIAL

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THEIR FISHING ZONE TO 50 MILES. AT SAME TIME, IN CONVERSATIONS WITH US (AND PRESUMABLY CHINESE) OFFICIALS, PAKS HAVE EXPRESSED GRAVE CONCERN OVER SOVIET INTENTIONS TOWARD SOUTH ASIA AND HAVE SKETCHED ALLEGED SOVIET GRAND DESIGN TO SWALLOW UP PAKISTAN AND IRAN. WHILE PART OF LATTER LINE UNDOUBTEDLY IS INTENDED FOR ITS EFFECT ON LISTENERS, NO QUESTION PAKS THEMSELVES ARE DISTANTLY WORRIED ABOUT SOVIETS. ON OTHER HAND, BHUTTO PRESUMABLY RETAINS HIS "TRIANGULAR BILATERALISM" GOAL OF INDEPENDENT PROFITABLY RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW, PEKING AND WASHINGTON; WITH MOSCOW NOW

WEAKEST LINK, FURTHER CAUTIOUS GOP EFFORTS WARM UP  
TO SOVIETS CAN BE EXPECTED.

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INFO AMEMBASSY DACCA

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CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 ISLAMABAD 1955

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

10. AFRO-ASIAN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN MAJOR  
TARGET OF PAK ATTENTION SINCE EARLY DAYS OF BHUTTO  
REGIME. WHILE PREDECESSOR REGIMES TENDED SEE THESE  
COUNTRIES LARGELY IN TERMS THEIR POSITION VIS-A-VIS  
INDIA, BHUTTO HAS ASSIDOUSLY CULTIVATED THEM AND  
SOUGHT TO DEMONSTRATE PAKISTAN'S CREDENTIALS AS ONE

OF THEM. HIS EFFORTS HAVE BEEN FOCUSED WITH  
PARTICULAR INTENSITY ON OTHER MUSLIM STATES, WITH  
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CAREFULLY DEVELOPED THEM OF PAN-ISLAM REACHING ITS  
CLIMAX IN PAKISTAN'S EXTRAORDINARY MANEUVERS TO  
CONVENE LAHORE SUMMIT. THERE APPEAR TO BE NUMBER OF  
REASONS FOR THIS CAMPAIGN. CONTINUED DESIRE FOR  
DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AGAINST INDIA IS CERTAINLY ONE OF  
THEM, BUT BEYOND THAT THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN CONSCIOUS  
DECISION ON BHUTTO'S PART TO EXPAND PAKISTAN'S -- AND HIS  
OWN -- INFLUENCE INTO NEW FOREIGN POLICY AREAS NOW  
THAT GOP NEED NO LONGER EXPEND ALL ITS DIPLOMATIC  
RESOURCES IN HOLDING ON TO EAST WING. AMONG VARIOUS  
MOTIVES FOR THIS ARE BHUTTO'S DESIRE BUILD UP COUNTRY'S  
DAMAGED SELF-ESTEEM, MATERIAL BENEFITS FROM COOPERATION  
WITH WEALTHY OIL PRODUCERS AMONG THEM, COMPATIBILITY  
WITH VAGUELY LEFTIST-INTERANTIONALISTS IDEOLOGY  
ESPOUSED BY BHUTTO AND HIS ADVISERS, AND BHUTTO'S  
OWN UNDISGUISED INTEREST IN CARVING OUT PERSONAL  
POSITION AS ONE OF THIRD WORLD'S LEADING SPOKESMEN.

11. GOP PURSUIT OF THIRD WORLD INFLUENCE WAS MARKED  
BY UPS AND DOWN DURING PAST YEAR. LOW POINT WAS  
PROBABLY ALGIERS NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE, WHERE  
PAKISTAN EXCLUSION ON GROUNDS CENTO MEMBERSHIP GAVE  
AFGHAN REP OPPORTUNITY DELIVER UNCHALLENGED ATTACK  
ON PAKISTAN. THIS WAS MORE THAN COUNTERED HOWEVER  
BY ALL-OUT AND ULTIMATELY SUCCESSFUL PAK EFFORT TO  
CONVENE LAHORE SUMMIT, FAR AND AWAY GOP'S GREATEST  
ACCOMPLISHMENT IN THIS AREA TO DATE.

12. APRT FROM GENERAL INTEREST IN THIRD WORLD,  
BHUTTO REGIME HAS SOUGHT TO DEVELOP SPECIAL LINKS  
WITH IRAN AND, MORE RECENTLY, WITH PERSIAN GULF  
EMIRATES. WITH FORMER, CLOSE TIES EXTEND BACK TO  
PREVIOUS REGIMES AND ARE BASED BOTH ON FORMAL ASSOCIATION  
THROUGH CENTO AND RCD AND ON SHARED PERCEPTIONS OF  
THREAT TO AREA. RELATIONS HAVE REMAINED CLOSE OVER  
PAST YEAR ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN RECENT SIGNS OF SOME  
PAK RESENTMENT AT SHAH'S PATRONIZING WAYS WITH THEM AND,  
LATELY, AT SHAH'S LEADING ROLE IN RAISING OIL PRICES.  
IN NEWLY INDEPENDENT AND NEWLY WEALTHY PERSIAN  
GULF STATES, BHUTTO SEES OPPORTUNITY TO BUILD SUBSTANTIAL  
INFLUENCE AS SUPPLIER OF TECHNOLOGY, LABOR AND MILITARY  
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EXPERTISE, OBVIOUSLY ANTICIPATING IN RETURN A FAIR SHARE OF GULF STATES' LARGESSE. HE MAY ALSO, OVER LONGER TERM, SEE POTENTIAL ROLE FOR PAKISTAN IN PROVIDING GULF STATES WITH AN ALTERNATIVE TO BOTH IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA AS CHIEF OUTSIDE FRIEND AND SPONSOR.

13. RELATIONS WITH US OVER PAST YEAR HAVE REMAINED AT EXISTING LEVEL OF CLOSE CORDIALITY, HIGHLIGHTED BY BHUTTO'S US VISIT IN SEPTEMBER. PAKS ACHIEVED ONE OF THEIR MAJOR GOALS EARLY IN YEAR WITH LIFTING OF TOTAL US EMBARGO ON ARMS SUPPLY TO SUBCONTINENT. LATTER, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN ONLY BEGINNING OF THEIR EFFORTS IN THIS FIELD, SINCE THEY HAVE FOUND RESIDUAL ARMS SUPPLY RESTRICTIONS BOTH MATERIALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY FRUSTRATING AND, ESPECIALLY, HAVE FOUND IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO RE-EQUIP THEIR FORCES TO EXTENT THEY DEEM NECESSARY WITHOUT ADDITIONAL EXTERNAL MILITARY AID, WHICH THEY CAN ONLY SEE AS COMING FROM US. IN OTHER AREAS, COOPERATION HAS BEEN CLOSE AND PAKS HAVE SHOWN FULL AWARENESS OF BENEFITS DERIVED FROM ASSOCIATION WITH US. MOST STRIKING EXAMPLE THIS COOPERATION CAME WITH MASSIVE US RELIEF EFFORT DURING DEVASTATING AUGUST-SEPTEMBER FLOODS, FOR WHICH GOP WAS OUTSPOKENLY GRATEFUL.

14. FINAL MAJOR ASPECT OF PAK FOREIGN POLICY OVER PAST YEAR HAS BEEN MARKED SUCCESS OF SUSTAINED EFFORT, EXTENDING BACK TO BEGINNING OF BHUTTO REGIME, TO WIPE OUT ADVERSE WORLD IMAGE OF PAKISTAN STEMMING FROM EVENTS OF 1971. THIS HAS BEEN MULTI-DIMENSIONAL EFFORT AND HAS BEEN ONE INGREDIENT OF PAK INITIATIVES IN VARIETY OF FIELDS RANGING FROM BHUTTO'S FREQUENT HIGHLY PUBLICIZED STATE VISITS TO THE SCORES OF SOLICITIOUS MESSAGES EXPRESSING GOP SYMPATHY WHENEVER THERE IS AN EARTHQUAKE IN CHILE OR A FLOOD IN FIJI. FINAL INTERMENT OF PAKISTAN'S 1971 IMAGE HOPEFULLY OCCURRED AT LAHORE WHEN BHUTTO, HOST TO THE MUSLIM WORLD, PUBLICLY EMBRACED MUJIB (AND LATTER SHOOK HANDS WITH TIKKA KHAN\*).

15. OF NEW FOEIGN POLICY PROBLEMS FOR GOP THAT HAVE  
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ARISEN DURING PAST YEAR, DAUD'S JULY 1973 COUP IN AFGHANISTAN WAS FIRST MAJOR ONE TO EMERGE. PAKS MADE INITIAL EFFORT TO GET ALONG WITH DAUD DESPITE HIS MILITANT RESURRECTION OF PUSHTUNISTAN ISSUE, ALTHOUGH IT POSED PARTICULAR DIFFICULTIES FOR PAKISTAN BECAUSE OF CURRENT POLITICAL UNREST IN FRONTIER AND BALUCHISTAN

AREAS COVETED BY AFGHANISTAN. WHEN AFGHAN CAMPAIGN SHOWED NO SIGNS OF ABATING, HOWEVER, PAKS LATE IN 1973 ADOPTED CONSIDERABLY MORE ASSERTIVE POSTURE MARKED BY SEVERAL VITRIOLIC BHUTTO SPEECHES AND WELL-PUBLICIZED TROOP DEPLOYMENTS NEAR BORDER. FOR MOMENT, THESE MOVES SEEM TO HAVE PAID OFF, IN THAT AFGHAN CAMPAIGN HAS SOMEWHAT ABATED IN PAST MONTH OR TWO. LONG AS DAUD REGIME CONTINUES TO ASSERT ACTIVELY THAT FRONTIER PROVINCE AND BALUCHISTAN ARE NOT INTEGRAL PARTS OF PAKISTAN, HOWEVER, RELATIONS WILL OBVIOUSLY REMAIN TROUBLED. PRIMARY PAK CONCERN IN THIS DISPUTE IS LESS WITH AFGHANISTAN ITSELF, WHICH GOP CONSIDERS NO MORE THAN MINOR THREAT MILITARILY, THAN WITH SOVIET PRESENCE WHICH PAKS SEE LOOMING BEHIND DAUD.

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MRN: 1974ISLAMA001955 SEGMENT NUMBER: 000004 ERROR READING TEXT INDEX  
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## Message Attributes

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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
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**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
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**Reference:** n/a  
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**Review Authority:** rowelle0  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:** ANOMALY  
**Review Date:** 25 APR 2002  
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**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** IN THE WAKE OF THE SUMMIT -- PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY SUMMARY: PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY OVER PAST YEAR HAS  
**TAGS:** PFOR, PK  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005